![]() ![]() The Shanghai Communiqué, signed on the very last day of Nixon’s visit, states quite clearly: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” This not particularly subtle jab by Mao was certainly intended to remind Nixon that the Taiwan issue must be viewed as part of the Chinese Civil War and not as an international dispute. This proved to be skillful chess, for sure, but today the decisions made relating to the thorny Taiwan question may turn out to be even more consequential and, therefore, deserve careful scrutiny.ĭuring the initial meeting between Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon on February 21, there is an interesting exchange about Taiwan, when Mao observes that “our common old friend … Chiang Kai Shek … calls us communist bandits.” Nixon seems to make an artful dodge by replying, “What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai Shek?”Īfter a short response by Zhou Enlai, China’s premier, Mao ends the exchange by asserting: “Actually, the history of our friendship with him is much longer than the history of your friendship with him.” ![]() Such signals helped to restrain the Cold War, inaugurating a period of détente between the superpowers. Even when the Cold War heated up again in the 1980s, the US was able to reap the benefits of the USSR expending enormous resources to fortify its long border with China. Strategically, the Kremlin faced the prospect of adversaries on two fronts. By demonstrating the willingness to work directly with Beijing, Washington’s message to Moscow was not subtle: Either moderate Soviet global ambitions or the US would help energize China’s deepening struggle against the USSR. True, American leaders were to be later disappointed that China was unable to “deliver” a negotiated end to the Vietnam War.Įven if the visit could not solve the burning Vietnam question, however, Nixon’s trip still had immense and positive geopolitical consequences. ![]() Yet the surprise visit to Beijing helped give America its “mojo” back, appearing as it did to demonstrate Americans’ willingness to rethink old assumptions and strive for making peace with old enemies, even in East Asia. This diplomatic maneuver amounted to such a radical turnabout in US foreign policy that Nixon’s national security adviser Henry Kissinger was at pains to keep the State Department completely in the dark. Kissinger deserves ample credit for successfully paving the way for the trip with his secret visit to the Chinese capital in July 1971 that made the subsequent Nixon visit possible.Īlso read: Fifty years on, lessons from Sino-US rapprochementĬhina’s demographic doomsayers cite the wrong data The visit featured one of the most right-wing, anti-communist figures in American politics sitting down to chat amiably with the world’s most preeminent exponent of Communist revolution. It was perhaps the boldest leap for American diplomacy in the 20th century. Yet as the “New Cold War” with China solidifies, there has never been a more important time to reflect on Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing. Between the Olympics and the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the 50th anniversary of US president Richard Nixon’s visit to China has not received the attention it deserves. That event not only helped transform China and US-China relations, but it played a major role in “winning” the Cold War and ushering in a new, multipolar, globalized system. ![]()
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